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NOTES
WHEN BIG BROTHER PLAYS GOD: THE RELIGION
CLAUSES, TITLE VII, AND THE
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
Joshua D. Dunlap*
We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is
wholly exempt from its cognizance.
-James Madison 1
INTRODUCTION
A congregation composed of immigrants from South Korea seeks
to hire a South Korean as its pastor. An inner-city Catholic parish
wants to hire a woman, instead of a man, to fill a counseling position.
A Native American religious group restricts its hiring criteria so that
only members of its own nation qualify to perform administrative
duties. A tiny Baptist church only wants a male pastor. Can these
religious entities make employment decisions according to such crite-
ria? Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 they cannot.
Title VII, which has been an important tool in the laudable fight to
eliminate discrimination in corporate America, forbids employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.A., Pre-law,
Pensacola Christian College, 2005. Special thanks to Professor Richard W. Garnett
for his valuable comments and suggestions. I also want to express my heartfelt
gratitude to my parents, who have always given me their unconditional love and
support. And I would be remiss if I failed to mention the rest of my family, all of
whom mean so much to me.
1 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
(June 20, 1785), inJAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 29, 30 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
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origin. 3 Unfortunately, the application of Title VII to religious institu-
tions in situations like those mentioned above4 might prohibit innocu-
ous behavior-and might have unintended constitutional
implications.
Clearly, the Constitution does not grant the federal government
unlimited regulatory power, even to further noble causes such as the
elimination of discrimination; 5 the government's enumerated powers
are constrained, for one, by independent constitutional provisions
such as the Religion Clauses.6 The Religion Clauses have particular
importance when aggrieved current or prospective employees bring
lawsuits against churches under Title VII. In such situations, Title VII
at least implicates-and possibly violates-the Religion Clauses. After
all, the application of Title VII to church employment decisions,
which are arguably exercises of religious discretion, might burden
churches' free exercise of religion or constitute a government estab-
lishment of religion. This conflict between Title VII and the Religion
Clauses pits two fundamental interests against each other. On one
hand, Title VII reflects this nation's dedication to eliminating discrim-
ination;7 on the other hand, the Religion Clauses embody the coun-
try's dedication to freedom of religion.8 The conflict between these
two interests requires courts to determine whether the application of
Title VII to churches violates the Religion Clauses and their attendant
3 See id. Section 703 reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.
4 It should be noted that Title VII does permit religious institutions to make
employment decisions based on an individual's religion; so, for instance, a Catholic
church could refuse to hire a Baptist preacher. See id. § 2000e-1 (a).
5 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)
(concluding that Congress exceeded its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it subjected states to suit in federal court for money damages
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000)).
6 The Religion Clauses declare that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
7 See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for
Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1079
(1996).
8 Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. RE-V.
1, 12 (2000).
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notions of free exercise, nonestablishment, and church autonomy.9
Essentially, the interplay between Title VII and the Religion Clauses
generates one basic-not to say simple-question: do the Religion
Clauses require a "ministerial exception" that excludes churches'
employment decisions from the scope of Title VII? 10
This Note argues that the Free Exercise Clause mandates a broad
ministerial exception to Title VII. Part I surveys circuit court decisions
to define the current scope of the ministerial exception doctrine and
examines a recent ministerial exception case, Petruska v. Gannon Uni-
versity.' Part II provides a justification for the ministerial exception
based on history and the original understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause-particularly in light of early state constitutions, the "theologi-
cal" rationale for religious freedom, and Madison's conception of
church-state relations. Part III turns to the application of the ministe-
rial exception, examining the conflict between Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral2 and Jones v. Wolf 3 and proposing that Kedroff s church
autonomy rationale should govern in ministerial exception cases.
This Note then addresses the proper scope of the ministerial excep-
tion, suggesting that government regulation of any church employ-
ment decision would extend the civil government's authority into
areas of exclusively religious cognizance. Ultimately, this Note con-
9 Oliver S. Thomas, The Application of Anti-Discrimination Laws to Religious Institu-
tions: The Irresistible Force Meets the Immoveable Object, 12J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L.JUDGES
83, 83 (1992).
10 Three primary strands of thought have arisen in academic circles in response
to this question. First, some scholars argue that the Religion Clauses do not preclude
the application of Title VII to religious institutions. See Whitney Ellenby, Divinity vs.
Discrimination: Curtailing the Divine Reach of Church Authority, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 369, 374-75 (1996); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions:
The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REv. 391, 431-32 (1987); Rutherford,
supra note 7, at 1128. Second, other scholars have promoted the idea that religious
institutions may or may not be exempt from Title VII, depending on the circum-
stances. See Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation
of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1514, 1549 (1979); G.
Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious
Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1232-38 (1994); Carl H.
Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organiza-
tions, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 410 (1984). Finally, a third group of scholars
suggest that certain religious institutions should always be exempted from Title VII's
requirements. See Kathleen Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surpris-
ing Lessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1633, 1698; Douglas Laycock, Towards a General
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1398 (1981).
11 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006).
12 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
13 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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cludes that the Free Exercise Clause exempts all church employment
decisions from the requirements of Title VII.
I. CURRENT MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION JURISPRUDENCE
Congress has never completely exempted religious institutions
from the requirements of Title VII. When Congress originally
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII provided extremely lim-
ited statutory protection for religious institutions; employees of a
religious organization who carried out the organization's religious
activities could not sue their employers for religious discrimination. 14
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to eliminate the language
regarding "religious activities"; the altered statutory exemption
excludes from Title VII any "religious corporation, association, educa-
tional institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of
a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on...
of its activities." 15 By adopting this provision after rejecting language
that would have excluded religious employers from Title VII alto-
gether,16 Congress chose not to "confer upon religious organizations
a license to make [employment] decisions on the basis of race, sex, or
national origin."17 Instead, Congress retained a fairly narrow statutory
exemption' 8-leaving it to the courts to determine whether the Con-
stitution required a broader exemption.
A. Scope of the Ministerial Exception
Beginning with the Fifth Circuit's 1972 decision in McClure v. Sal-
vation Army,' 9 the circuit courts created a constitutional exemption
14 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a) (2000)).
15 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat.
103, 103-04 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a) (2000)) (emphasis
added). Congress has also provided other narrow exceptions that may affect religious
institutions' employment decisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
16 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON LABOR, S. COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D
CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at
1229-30, 1258-60 (Comm. Print 1972).
17 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166
(4th Cir. 1985).
18 Courts have uniformly recognized that Congress retained a fairly narrow statu-
tory exemption. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2006),
petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S.Jan. 16, 2007) (No. 06-985); Scharon v. St.
Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 361-62 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1991);
EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982).
19 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
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from Title VII-the ministerial exception. 20 In one sense, the ministe-
rial exception exceeds the scope of the statutory exemption by permit-
ting religious organizations to avoid the burden of conforming to any
of Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions, including those regarding
race, sex, and national origin, when they select their ministers. "Sim-
ply stated, the ministerial exception insulates a religious organiza-
tion's employment decisions regarding its ministers from judicial
scrutiny under Tide VII."2 1 In another sense, however, the ministerial
exception is narrower than the statutory exemption because it only
prevents the government from imposing secular standards on relig-
ious organizations' ministerial employment decisions-unlike the stat-
utory exemption, the ministerial exception does not affect
employment decisions regarding "secular" employees. 22 Although the
20 The McClure court found that the First Amendment required a ministerial
exception, but ultimately construed the statute so as to avoid the constitutional ques-
tion. Id. at 560-61. Subsequent cases have addressed the constitutional question
squarely, but the resulting justifications for the ministerial exception have varied from
circuit to circuit. Some courts have concluded that adjudication of Title VII claims in
cases involving religious institutions would violate the Establishment Clause. See
Scharon, 929 F.2d at 361-63; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171-72. Other courts have cited
the Free Exercise Clause as the foundation for the ministerial exception. See Bollard
v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y ofJesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999); Young v. N. Il1.
Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187-88 (7th Cir. 1994). Yet
others have viewed the church autonomy doctrine as an independent basis for the
ministerial exception. See Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999). This Note sets forth ajustifica-
tion for the ministerial exception based on the Free Exercise Clause. See infra text
accompanying notes 107-15.
21 Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944.
22 EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000)
("[T]he exception would not apply to employment decisions concerning purely cus-
todial or administrative personnel."). Notably, while the exception only applies to
ministerial employment decisions, the circuit courts have refused to review such deci-
sions regardless of the institution's motivations. As the Fifth Circuit opined, it is
impossible to "conceive how the federal judiciary could determine whether an
employment decision concerning a minister was based on legitimate or illegitimate
grounds without inserting [thejudiciary] into a realm where the Constitution forbids
[the courts] to tread, the internal management of a church." Combs, 173 F.3d at 350.
Accordingly, the "state may no more require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning
than it may.supervise doctrinal content." Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; accord Werft v.
Desert Sw. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1102
(9th Cir. 2004) (" [R] equiring a church to articulate a religious justification for a per-
sonnel decision, such as firing a minister, is one ... way in which government may not
constitutionally interfere with religion."); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop, 320
F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003) (permitting any examination of the reasons for church
employment decisions "would enmesh the court. in endless inquiries as to whether
each discriminatory act was based in Church doctrine or simply secular animus").
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exception varies somewhat among the eight circuits23 that have recog-
nized it, the resolution of ministerial exception cases generally
depends on two factors: the type of religious institution and the func-
tion of the employee. 24
1. Characteristics of a Qualifying "Religious Institution"
Despite the significance of the definition of "religious institution"
for the purposes of the ministerial exception, 25 circuit courts have
never set out the characteristics of a qualifying religious institution in
the form of a categorical rule. Professor Thomas has suggested that
there is a dichotomy between "pervasively sectarian" institutions, such
as churches, and "religiously affiliated" institutions, such as religious
hospitals or schools.26 According to Thomas, courts treat pervasively
religious institutions with more deference than religiously affiliated
institutions. 27 Pervasively religious institutions are always exempt
from regulation of ministerial employment decisions but may not be
exempt with regard to decisions concerning secular employees.28 On
the other hand, religiously affiliated institutions are usually exempt
from regulation of their ministerial employment decisions but are
always subject to regulation of their secular employment decisions. 29
Cases involving religiously affiliated institutions-which provide the
best available indications of what institutions fall under the ministerial
exception 30-have provided case-by-case examinations of the issue
23 The eight circuits that have adopted the ministerial exception include the
Third Circuit, Petruska, 462 F.3d at 305; the Fourth Circuit, Rayburn, 772 F.2d at
1170-72; the Fifth Circuit, McClure, 460 F.2d at 560; the Seventh Circuit, Young, 21
F.3d at 185; the Eighth Circuit, Scharon, 929 F.2d at 362; the Ninth Circuit, Bollard,
196 F.3d at 945; the Eleventh Circuit, Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church,
Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2000); and the D.C. Circuit, EEOC v. Catholic
Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
24 Thomas, supra note 9, at 100; cf Buchanan, supra note 10, at 1211-26 (focus-
ing on the type of discrimination and the function of the employee as the two crucial
variables in the ministerial exception analysis).
25 The definition of "religious institution" is critical because, in the words of the
Fourth Circuit, the ministerial exception only protects the employment decisions of
"religious institution [s]." Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168. Qualifying as a religious institu-
tion is a threshold which must be satisfied in order to trigger the ministerial
exception.
26 See Thomas, supra note 9, at 101-06.
27 See id. at 101-02.
28 See id. at 101, 103-06.
29 See id. at 101-03.
30 Many ministerial exception cases involving pervasively religious institutions do
not discuss this issue because the defendant institution's religious nature was so clear
that the plaintiff did not challenge it. See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Confer-
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that, when taken together, suggest several general rules regarding the
characteristics of a qualifying religious institution. First, an institution
that is controlled or financed by a church or religious organization
can qualify as a religious institution; the institution itself does not have
to be a church-as in a congregation that meets for worship-in
order to qualify.3' Second, an institution that acts as the instrument
of a church can qualify as a religious institution.3 2 Third, an institu-
tion that fulfills some religious function, even if it does not exclusively
carry out religious activities, can qualify as a religious institution.33
Aside from these general rules, however, the circuit courts have pro-
vided little guidance in determining what institutions qualify for the
ministerial exception.
2. Characteristics of a "Ministerial" Employee
The second crucial definition in ministerial exception cases is the
definition of "minister." The ministerial exception currently does not
affect all hiring decisions made by religious institutions; rather, it only
affects decisions regarding ministers. "[T]he exception shelters cer-
tain employment decisions ... so as to preserve the independence of
religious institutions in performing their spiritual functions. Where
no spiritual function is involved, the First Amendment does not stay
the application of a generally applicable law such as Title VII . ... "34
Accordingly, courts must ascertain whether the employee fills a "spiri-
tual" or "religious" function in order to determine whether the
employee is a "minister." That determination does not depend upon
ordination; rather, the circuit courts have endorsed a more compre-
hensive and fact-specific inquiry. 35 "'As a general rule, if the
employee's primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith,
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or
participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she should be con-
ence of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1999); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 556 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1972).
31 EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981).
32 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
33 Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th
Cir. 1991).
34 EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir.
2000).
35 Id.; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 461. Indeed, courts have refused to classify some
individuals as ministers, despite their ordination. See Sw. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283-85.
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sidered clergy.'" 36 Circuit courts have identified certain factors that
would indicate such a spiritual role, including whether the individual
would be "qualified and authorized to perform the ceremonies of the
Church,"37 "'engaged in activities traditionally considered ecclesiasti-
cal,'"38 or responsible for "conveying the message of [the] organiza-
tion to the public as a whole." 39 Given the open-ended and somewhat
ambiguous nature of this "test," the circuit courts have found a wide
variety of individuals to qualify as a minister. 40 Unsurprisingly, courts
have also occasionally misunderstood the spiritual import of some
employment positions.41 Nevertheless, courts continue to make this
inquiry, as evidenced by the Third Circuit's decision in Petruska.42
B. Petruska v. Gannon University
In Petruska, the Third Circuit took up the Title VII claims and
state law claims of Lynette Petruska, the first female chaplain of Gan-
non University.43 The litigation involved a dispute that arose after
Petruska helped unseat the president of the private Catholic Univer-
sity.4 4 About two years after the president's resignation, the University
restructured its administration and curtailed Petruska's responsibili-
ties.45 The decision to restructure, which Petruska believed was moti-
vated by gender discrimination, instigated a heated series of meetings
and e-mail exchanges between Petruska and members of the adminis-
tration. 46  The exchange culminated in Petruska's resignation.47
Petruska then filed state law claims alleging, inter alia, breach of con-
36 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169
(4th Cir. 1985) (quoting Bagni, supra note 10, at 1545 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
37 Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999).
38 Id. (quoting Sw. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284).
39 Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop, 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2003).
40 See, e.g., id. at 703-04 (press secretary); Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176 (lay choir
director); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 463-64 (member of university canon law faculty);
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168 (non-ordained associate in pastoral care); Sw. Baptist, 651
F.2d at 283 (faculty of seminary).
41 See Brady, supra note 10, at 1692-93 (arguing that, for instance, the court in
Southwestern Baptist failed to recognize the spiritual function of the administrative staff
at the seminary).
42 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 304 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006), petition for cert.
filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007) (No. 06-985).
43 Id. at 299-300.
44 Id. at 300.
45 Id. at 300-01.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 301.
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tract as well as Title VII claims alleging gender and retaliatory
discrimination. 48
In addressing these claims, the Third Circuit confronted the
question of whether adjudication of Title VII claims against a religious
university would violate the First Amendment. 49 The court noted that
most circuits had adopted the ministerial exception to prevent "any
inquiry into a religious organization's underlying motivation for"
employment decisions regarding clergy. 50 The Third Circuit agreed
that applying Title VII to ministerial employment decisions would vio-
late the First Amendment and joined the other circuits in adopting
the exception. 51 According to the court, the ministerial exception
"bar[s] any claim, the resolution of which would limit a religious insti-
tution's right to select who will perform particular spiritual
functions."52
In setting forth its constitutional justification for the ministerial
exception, the Third Circuit relied upon two distinct aspects of the
Free Exercise Clause. First, the court recognized that the Free Exer-
cise Clause protects an individual's "'right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires.'" 53 The court reasoned that
this right extended to churches as institutions because, "like an indi-
vidual, a church in its collective capacity must be free to express relig-
ious beliefs ... and communicate its religious message." 54 In order to
communicate its message, a church must "retain the corollary right to
select its voice." 55 Accordingly, because a minister is the "embodi-
ment of [a church's] message," the court determined that the selec-
tion of a minister is "per se a religious exercise" with which the
judiciary could not interfere.56 Second, the court recognized that
Kedroff had established the principle that the Free Exercise Clause
protects "a religious institution's right to decide matters of faith, doc-
trine, and church governance." 57 The court concluded that a relig-
ious employer's selection of its ministers implicated this right because
ministerial employment decisions are, ultimately, decisions about
"who would perform . . . constitutionally protected spiritual functions"
48 Id. at 301-02.
49 Id. at 303.
50 Id. at 304-05 & n.7.
51 Id. at 305.
52 Id. at 307.
53 Id. at 306 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
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such as teaching or spreading the faith. 58 Accordingly, the court held
that ministerial employment decisions are "protected from govern-
mental interference by the Free Exercise Clause. '5 9
The court then applied the ministerial exception to the case at
hand by asking "whether application of the state or federal law
[would] limit Gannon's right to choose who performs particular spiri-
tual functions on its behalf."60 Because Petruska's Title VII claims did
implicate the University's constitutionally protected right to deter-
mine who would perform the spiritual functions filled by the chaplain,
the court concluded that the ministerial exception barred the
claims. 6' The court then turned to Petruska's state law claims. 62 The
court found that the application of state contract law to the Univer-
sity's employment decisions would not violate the Free Exercise
Clause because "[o]n its face, application of state contract law does
not involve government-imposed limits on Gannon's right to select its
ministers: Unlike the duties under Title VII . . . contractual obliga-
tions are entirely voluntary."63 Having disposed of the Free Exercise
Clause challenge to the contract claim, the court then examined
whether adjudication of the claim would violate the Establishment
Clause by creating excessive entanglement with religion. 64 The court
concluded that it did not because the "[r] esolution of this claim [did]
not turn on an ecclesiastical inquiry."65 Accordingly, the court dis-
missed Petruska's Title VII claims and remanded her state contract
claim. 66
58 Id. at 307.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 307-08.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 310.
64 Id. at 310-11.
65 Id. at 312. The Third Circuit's decision not to consider the Establishment
Clause until it had completed its ministerial exception analysis distinguishes it from
other circuits, many of which have cited the Establishment Clause as ajustification for
the ministerial exception. See cases cited infra note 108. Many of these courts have
concluded that adjudicating Title VII claims against churches would foster excessive
government entanglement with religion on a substantive and procedural level. See,
e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948-49 (9th Cir.
1999); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1170-71 (4th Cir. 1985).
66 Petruska, 462 F.3d at 308, 312.
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II. HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
This necessarily cursory review of current ministerial exception
jurisprudence answers the initial question this Note posed about Title
VI-according to the vast majority of circuit courts, the application of
Title VII to religious institutions' ministerial employment decisions
does violate the Religion Clauses. But this answer only gives rise to
another question: are the courts correct in their reasoning, or have
they misconstrued the First Amendment? Scholars have challenged
the logic of the ministerial exception; in particular, some have ques-
tioned whether religious institutions have Free Exercise Clause
rights. 67 The answer to this challenge, contrary to the assertion of
Professor Lupu, 68 can be found in history and the original under-
standing of the Free Exercise Clause. 69 Early state constitutions, the
"theological" rationale for religious freedom, and Madison's concep-
tion of church-state relations combine to provide a historical justifica-
tion for the ministerial exception.
A. Early State Constitutions
The concept of a ministerial exception was not foreign to early
American constitutional thought. The constitutions of the original
thirteen states, which provide an invaluable source of insight into the
Founders' political theories,70 demonstrate that the Founders con-
strued the power of government narrowly in regard to the church-
minister relationship. Four early states-including three of the origi-
nal thirteen states-expressly viewed ministerial employment deci-
67 See Lupu, supra note 10, at 402.
68 Id. at 419 (arguing that "nothing in the debates or early drafts of the religion
clauses gives the slightest support to the concept of corporate free exercise
exemptions").
69 Admittedly, some scholars reject a historical approach to constitutional inter-
pretation. A historical inquiry, however, provides some benefit even to those who
adhere to this viewpoint. See Esbeck, supra note 10, at 353; see also Douglas Laycock,
Regulatmy Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1793, 1796 (2006) ("[O] riginal understanding is
relevant on almost any view of constitutional interpretation .... ). For a general
discussion of the competing theories of First Amendment interpretation, see FRANK-
LYN S. HAIMAN, RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 11-23
(2003).
70 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 618 (1950);
see also, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REx,. 1109, 1117-18 (1990) (using state constitutional provisions as a histor-
ical tool to understand the First Amendment).
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sions as an element of religious liberty and specifically guaranteed
church autonomy in ministerial employment decisions.
The Massachusetts Constitution, which John Adams drafted, 71
protected churches' freedom to employ ministers upon their own
terms. According to the Massachusetts Constitution, freedom of relig-
ion included the right for churches to make autonomous decisions
regarding the employment of their ministers. Article III of Part I
read: "Provided . . . that the several towns, parishes, precincts, and
other bodies politic, or religious societies, shall, at all times, have the
exclusive right of electing their public teachers, and of contracting with them
for their support and maintenance." 72 This provision secured to relig-
ious societies the right to pay their ministers directly, rather than
through the town treasurer.73 More importantly, the provision guar-
anteed that religious societies could choose whom they wanted as a
minister, rather than having the civil government appoint a minis-
ter.74 Although Massachusetts had established a state religion, 75 the
drafters of the constitution recognized ministerial employment deci-
sions to be a matter of exclusively ecclesiastical, as opposed to civil,
concern.
Nor were Adams and the Massachusetts framers alone in believ-
ing that religious liberty necessitated such specific protection of the
church-minister relationship. Connecticut, Maine, and New Hamp-
shire included similar provisions in their state constitutions. Connect-
icut provided that "each and every [religious] society or
denomination . . . shall have and enjoy the same and equal powers,
rights and privileges, and shall have power and authority to support
71 John Witte Jr., One Public Religion, Many Private Religions, in THE FOUNDERS ON
GOD AND GOVERNMENT 23, 27 (Daniel L. Dreisbach et al. eds., 2004).
72 MAss. CONST. Pt. I, art. III (amended 1833) (emphasis added). The language
regarding parishes, towns, and precincts quickly lost its import. Originally, Massachu-
setts towns and parishes were identical to the church. See Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488,
499 (1820) ("[A] parish, in this sense, is the same with a particular church or congre-
gation; and this . . . is plainly agreeable with the sense, custom, and platform of the
New England churches."). Upon disestablishment, towns and parishes could no
longer be equated with the church, so Massachusetts revised its ministerial provision
to protect only churches. See MAss. CONST. art. XI ("[T]he several religious societies
of this commonwealth, whether corporate or unincorporate, at any meeting legally
warned and holden for that purpose, shall ever have the right to elect their pastors or
religious teachers, to contract with them for their support, to raise money for erecting
and repairing houses for public worship, for the maintenance of religious instruction,
and for the payment of necessary expenses .. .
73 See Witte, supra note 71, at 32-33.
74 Id. at 33.
75 LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 115 (rev. ed. 1967).
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and maintain the ministers or teachers of their respective denomina-
tions."76 The Maine Constitution replicated Massachusetts' ministe-
rial provision: "[A]ll religious societies in this State, whether
incorporate or unincorporate, shall at all times have the exclusive
right of electing their public teachers, and contracting with them for
their support and maintenance. ' 77 Article VI of the New Hampshire
Constitution permitted a state establishment of religion, " [p] rovided
notwithstanding, that the several towns, parishes, bodies corporate, or
religious societies, shall, at all times, have the exclusive right of elect-
ing their own public teachers, and of contracting with them for their
support and maintenance.."78
76 CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. VII, § 1. Arguably, this provision is less expansive
than the other states' provisions. The Connecticut provision does not grant "exclu-
sive" power to contract with its ministers, but instead only recognizes the right to
"maintain" ministers. Id. Nevertheless, it still demonstrates that the Founders recog-
nized the fundamental importance of the ministerial position to the existence of
religious institutions.
77 ME. CONST. art. I, § 3. The Maine provision, similar to the Massachusetts min-
isterial clause even though Maine prohibited the establishment of religion, demon-
strates-along with the amended Massachusetts provision-that church autonomy in
ministerial employment decisions was not merely a limitation upon state establish-
ment of religion, but rather an independent aspect of the right to free exercise.
78 N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. VI (amended 1968). As in Massachusetts, the language
regarding towns lost its import upon disestablishment and was eventually eliminated.
N.H. CoNsT. pt. I, art. VI ("[T]he several parishes, bodies corporate, or religious soci-
eties shall at all times have the right of electing their own teachers, and of contracting
with them for their support or maintenance, or both.").
The New Hampshire Supreme Court's interpretation of the ministerial clause
contained within its own constitution makes it clear that the framers of early state
constitutions considered ministerial employment decisions to be an essential element
of ecclesiastical independence from the state. See Holt v. Downs, 58 N.H. 170, 177
(1877). In reaching this conclusion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court referred to
the Massachusetts Constitution-which, the court candidly admitted, was the source
for the New Hampshire ministerial clause. See id. at 176.
If the Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1779-'80, in the midst of
the struggle for liberty, had proposed that the power, believed, at least by
men of controlling influence, if not by the majority of the voters, to be a
"prerogative" "granted by Christ" to the church, should be taken from the
church .. . it seems equally certain that the proposition would have been
regarded by the convention as one necessary to be explained, and that no
explanation would have induced the people to accept it. No such overthrow
of a fundamental doctrine of the ruling class could have been intended.
And, if the legal meaning of the proviso cannot be drawn from the
actual intent of the men who adopted it, it cannot, by legal construction, be
made an inexplicable anomaly in our system of civil and religious rights....
The words, "Provided, notwithstanding," are significant. They emphasize a
limitation of legislative power in ecclesiastical affairs, and introduce, not an
20071 201 7
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These early constructions of the right to free exercise demon-
strate that the framers of the New England constitutions understood
the importance of ministerial employment decisions to the exercise of
religious liberty. The language of the New England constitutions-
"religious societies" have an "exclusive" right to make contracts
regarding the employment of their ministers-sounds peculiarly simi-
lar to the modern ministerial exception. Indeed, the church employ-
ment provisions are remarkable manifestations of a robust church
autonomy doctrine; states which had established a state religion-a
measure that Madison considered to be a restriction on religious lib-
erty7 9-nevertheless protected the church-minister relationship as a
fundamental element of religious liberty. The provisions reflect their
authors' recognition that the individual or entity which selects a
church's ministers controls the church itself'30 and that, in turn,
churches play a vital role in maintaining individual free exercise. 8 1
Accordingly, the framers of the New England constitutions, in order
to grant religious freedom genuine protection, 82 sought to ensure
that civil government could not regulate the selection of church
employees. In other words, these framers endorsed an approach to
church employment decisions similar to that of the judicially-created
ministerial exception to Title VII.
But is it fair to superimpose the reasoning of the Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Maine, and New Hampshire constitutions on the Federal
invasion, but a guaranty, of religious independence. Not only is there no
word indicating a design of depriving any religious association of the right of
electing their own teachers, but the contrary design is expressed. A church,
incorporated or unincorporated, not connected with a parish, has the exclu-
sive right of electing its own teachers.
Id. at 177.
79 Madison argued against state establishment of religion because "[t]he Religion
of every man must ... be left to the conviction and conscience of every man."
Madison, supra note 1, at 30.
80 See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972).
81 See BETTE NOVrT EVANS, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 43
(1997) ("[R]eligious meanings perpetuate themselves through collective activities.
Hence, protecting religion must include protecting the social institutions that enable
it to exist."). In Massachusetts, Adams' prescience regarding the importance of
church autonomy in ministerial employment decisions became apparent almost
immediately. As soon as the parishes were free to contract with ministers who agreed
with their religious beliefs, they began rejecting the established Calvinist viewpoint
and hiring Unitarian ministers. See Witte, supra note 71, at 32-33.
82 As the Ashfield Baptists wrote in a petition to the General Court: "[I]fwe may
not settle and support a minister agreeable to our own consciences, where is liberty of
conscience?" Petition of the Ashfield Baptists to the General Court (1768), in STAN-
LEY GRENZ, ISAAC BACKus-PuRiTAN AND BApTIST 172 (1983).
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Constitution in order to justify the ministerial exception? After all,
the Founders did not use the language of these particular state consti-
tutions in the Federal Religion Clauses. The state constitutional provi-
sions would simply be historical anomalies if they did not reflect the
Founders' conception of the relationship between civil government
and the church. However, as Roger Williams' and James Madison's
writings demonstrate, the state constitutions-far from being anoma-
lous-reflect the Founders' views of church-state relations and com-
port with one of the primary rationales for the adoption of the
Religion Clauses.
B. Theological Rationale for the Religion Clauses
The Religion Clauses have a richer-and somewhat different-
history than many realize. 83 The Religion Clauses were not primarily
a function of the Enlightenment rationalism prevalent in Europe. On
the contrary, many proponents of the First Amendment advanced
religious reasons for free exercise and nonestablishment-most signif-
icantly the Baptists, who advocated a "theological school of thought"
8 4
in support of religious freedom. The proponents of the "theological"
view, who played a determinative role in the framing of the Religion
Clauses,85 argued that the Religion Clauses were necessary to prevent
the state from interfering with the functions of the church. 86 Indeed,
until Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists years after the adoption
of the Bill of Rights, the discussion regarding the First Amendment
had not been framed in terms of "separation of church and state,"
83 Scholars have already written extensively about the history behind the Religion
Clauses, so it will not be repeated in detail here. See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 10, at
354-69; Marci A. Hamilton & Rachel Steamer, The Religious Origins of Disestablishment
Principles, 81 NOTRE DAME L. Rxv. 1755, 1767-88 (2006); Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409,
1421-1503 (1990).
84 See MARK HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 8 (1965) ("Williams' princi-
ple of separation was primarily a principle of theology and Jefferson's predominantly
a principle of politics."). For a discussion of the continuing importance of a religious
justification for religious liberty, see Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 169-78, 196-223 (1991).
85 Esbeck, supra note 10, at 356; see also HoWE, supra note 84, at 19 (arguing that
the idea of separation of church and state is "generally understood to be more the
expression of Roger Williams' philosophy than that of Jefferson's"); PFEFFER, supra
note 75, at 98-114 (describing the influence of the Baptists in Virginia and elsewhere
in shaping religious liberty).
86 See HowE, supra note 84, at 18; Paul G. Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First
Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, in CHURCH AND STATE 67 (Philip B. Kurland
ed., 1976).
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which implicitly limited the church, but rather in terms of establish-
ment and free exercise, which only limited civil government. 87
One of the earliest American advocates of the "theological school
of thought," Roger Williams, 88 set out the fundamental "theological"
justification for preventing the state from regulating ministerial
employment decisions. Williams argued that in order to accord ade-
quate protection for religious freedom, the state must not interfere
with the church as it fulfilled its unique spiritual mission.89 Accord-
ingly, Williams conceived of church-state relations as two mutually
exclusive spheres. 90 The ecclesiastical sphere included "setting up
that forme of Church Government only, of which Christ hath given
them a pattern in his Word" and "[e]lecting and ordaining of such
officers onely, as Christ hath appointed."91 By logical extension,
"Magistrates, as Magistrates, have no power of setting up the Forme of
Church Government, [or] electing Church officers." 92 According to
Williams, civil government may not regulate a church's decisions
regarding its polity, whether the decision addresses the church's form
of government or the selection of church employees.
Civil government, according to Williams' "theological" viewpoint,
does not have the authority to interfere with the selection of church
ministers. To Williams, the ecclesiastical sphere encompasses the
church's exclusive right to select ministers, while the civil sphere does
not include the regulation of church polity-a position identical to
that of the ministerial exception to Title VII. Williams' theory of
church-state relations became influential in the formation of early
American constitutional theory; through such men as Isaac Backus
and John Leland, Williams' theory of church autonomy in ecclesiasti-
cal governance directly influenced the framing of the early New
87 DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 52 (2002).
88 See STOKES, supra note 70, at 201; Esbeck, supra note 10, at 357-58.
89 Esbeck, supra note 10, at 358.
90 See STOKES, supra note 70, at 199. Isaac Backus, an influential proponent of the
"theological" viewpoint, wrote: "[I] t is needful to observe, that God has appointed two
kinds of government in the world, which are distinct in their nature, and ought never
to be confounded together; one of which is called civil, the other ecclesiastical gov-
ernment." ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 9 (Boston,
John Boyle 1773).
91 ROGER WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT OF PERSECUTION (1644), reprinted in 3
THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 1, 248 (Samuel L. Caldwell ed., 1963).
92 Id.
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England constitutions9 3 as well as the First Amendment. 94 The writ-
ings of Madison would also reflect this distinct conception of religious
liberty.95
C. Writings of James Madison
Madison's political theory manifested the influence of Williams'
"theological" view of religious freedom. Certainly, Madison's concep-
tion of church-state relations did not resemble the constitutional ver-
sion of the Berlin Wall or the Great Wall of China-meant to keep
church out of civil society but not vice versa-that it has become. 96
Rather, Madison "advocated a jurisdictional division between religion
and government based on the demands of religion. '9 7 Madison
argued that "if Religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at
large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body."98
Madison employed the imagery of a barrier constraining the powers
of the government: "The preservation of a free Government requires,
not merely, that the metes and bounds which separate each depart-
ment of power be invariably maintained; but more especially that
neither of them be suffered to overleap the great Barrier which
93 See PFEFFER, supra note 75, at 100 (describing Backus' correspondence with
John Adams, the drafter of the Massachusetts Constitution, on the issue of state-estab-
lished ministers).
94 David Little, Roger Williams and the Separation of Church and State, in RELIGION
AND THE STATE 4, 7-15 (James Wood ed., 1985) (arguing that Williams influenced the
Founders' view of religious liberty through John Locke and Isaac Backus).
95 See PFEFFER, supra note 75, at 99-100.
96 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 115 (arguing that "for most
members of the Founding Generation the idea of separating church from state meant
protecting the church from the state-not the state from the church"). The "wall of
separation" metaphor has wrongly emphasized separation concerns over free exercise
concerns. The First Amendment was not intended to expel religion from the public
arena; even Thomas Jefferson, contrary to popular opinion, did not intend for his
"wall of separation" metaphor to imply a limit to the authority of the church. "The
'wall' reassured New England Baptists and others that the First Amendment inhibited
the federal government from interfering with their religious exercise .... [Jefferson]
understood that its strictures were not imposed on state governments or on the volun-
tary religious societies." DREISBACH, supra note 87, at 68-69; see also ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 17-47 (1982) (concluding that history demon-
strates that neither Madison norJefferson conceived of the First Amendment as creat-
ing strict separation of church and state); HowE, supra note 84, at 19 (contending
that the First Amendment was meant to "safeguard the spiritual realm from the
encroachments of government"); STOKES, supra note 70, at 516 (arguing that Jeffer-
son's main concern was "to prevent interference by the State in religious matters").
97 McConnell, supra note 83, at 1453.
98 Madison, supra note 1, at 30.
2007] 2021
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
defends the rights of the people."9 9 Madison believed that civil gov-
ernment should not abridge this "barrier" by establishing a religion
because, simply, the idea that the "Civil Magistrate is a competent
Judge of Religious Truth" could only be seen as "an arrogant preten-
sion falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages."100
Madison's theory of religious freedom, consistent with Williams'
writings and the New England constitutions, implies that the civil gov-
ernment not only should not but actually may not usurp ecclesiastical
functions. According to Professor Dreisbach, Madison's conception
of religious freedom departed "from the old-world regime of religious
toleration, in which religious exercise was a mere privilege that the civil
state could grant or revoke at its pleasure." 10 1 The church does not
possess its sphere of authority at the pleasure of the state; rather, its
authority comes from a higher source altogether. Religious liberty is,
at its core, a fundamental right rather than a product of the revocable
lenience of the state. As Madison wrote, "This right is in its nature an
unalienable right."10 2 Therefore, while delineating a precise line
between the spheres of church and state may be difficult' 0 3-perhaps
nearly impossible-Madison argued that the line cannot be obliter-
ated by the state and must be drawn in favor of the church's unalien-
able right of religious freedom. A "corrupting coalition" of civil
government and ecclesiastical government or a "usurpation" of one or
the other, Madison wrote, "will be best guarded [against] by an entire
abstinance of the Govt. from interference in any way whatever, beyond
the necessity of preserving public order, & protecting each sect
[against] trespasses on its legal rights by others."'10 4
99 Id.
100 Id. at 32.
101 DREISBACH, supra note 87, at 86; see also STOKES, supra note 70, at 340
("Madison did not believe that 'toleration' was sufficient.").
102 Madison, supra note 1, at 30; see also TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH
AND STATE 150 (1998) (relating Madison's view of the unalienable nature of religious
liberty).
103 Madison himself wrote, "[I]t may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace
the line of separation between the rights of religion and the Civil authority with such
distinctness as to avoid collisions & doubts on unessential points." Letter from James
Madison to Reverend Adams, in 9 THE WRITINGS OFJAMEs MADISON 484, 487 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1910).
104 Id. Even Jefferson subscribed to the idea that the Religion Clauses protect the
internal decisions of religious institutions. Jefferson wrote, "I consider the govern-
ment of the United States as interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling with
religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises." Letter from Thomas Jef-
ferson to the Reverend Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in DREISBACH, supra note 87, at
153 (emphasis added). According to this rationale, government interference with the
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Madison's theory has salience in the modern debate over the
ministerial exception to Title VII. Because Madison's views strongly
influenced the drafting of the First Amendment, 10 5 the Free Exercise
Clause embodies and gives constitutional force to the argument that
civil government does not have the authority to regulate religious mat-
ters. Therefore, the Free Exercise Clause, in accord with Madison's
and Williams' views, protects religious freedom by requiring the state
to refrain from usurping ecclesiastical functions-one of the most
important of which is the selection of ministers. 10 6 As an aspect of the
religious freedom protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the right of
churches to choose their ministers is not revocable at the will of the
state. Accordingly, the Free Exercise Clause does indeed insulate
church employment decisions from state regulations such as Title VII.
D. Summary and Interpretive Implications
This overview of the relevant history of the First Amendment
establishes the fundamental justification for the ministerial exception
to Title VII. The New England constitutions suggest that ministerial
employment decisions constitute a significant aspect of church auton-
omy, reflecting Williams' view that civil government and ecclesiastical
government have distinct spheres of authority. Under this theory of
church autonomy, both church and state are prohibited from infring-
ing upon the authority of the other; the church is not to wield the
sword and the state cannot assume clerical robes. Madison's writings
attest that this concept of church autonomy within the ecclesiastical
sphere influenced the formation of-and is protected by-the Relig-
ion Clauses. Therefore, the church autonomy doctrine embodied in
the Religion Clauses forbids the government from interfering not
only with church doctrine, but also with the internal governance deci--
sions of religious institutions. Church polity is no less sacrosanct than
church doctrine.
The proper locus of this church autonomy doctrine-and its
corollary, the ministerial exception to Title VII-is the Free Exercise
Clause. Several circuit courts have relied upon the test devised in
internal affairs of religious institutions would be as unconstitutional as government
interference with the doctrine of religious institutions.
105 See McConnell, supra note 83, at 1455 ("No other political figure played so
large a role in the enactment of the religion clauses as Jefferson and Madison.");
Witte, supra note 71, at 100.
106 See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006), petition for cert.
filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S.Jan. 16, 2007) (No. 06-985); Minker v. Balt. Annual Con-
ference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972).
2007 ] 2023
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Lemon v. Kurtzman'0 7 to justify the ministerial exception to the Estab-
lishment Clause;' 08 however, there has been significant dissatisfaction
with this analytical framework. 10 9 At the very least, the Lemon test con-
flates the analyses of the Religion Clauses because its entanglement
prong has been construed to prevent the government from burdening
religion-a function better suited to the Free Exercise Clause.1 10 Nev-
ertheless, some have argued that the Establishment Clause should still
provide the locus for the ministerial exception; Professor Esbeck has
suggested that "the Establishment Clause concepts of nonentangle-
ment and noninterference in intrafaith disputes should be unified
and interpreted toward a general theory permitting only a limited role
for government in the affairs of religious entities." '' Esbeck correctly
notes that a proper Establishment Clause analysis compels the civil
government to avoid regulation of matters such as "doctrine, disci-
pline, appointment of religious personnel, church polity, internal
administration, and religious practice."1 1 2 Indeed, government con-
trol over clergy is a quintessential indication of an established church.
However, until the Lemon analysis is discarded in favor of a unified,
historically justifiable Establishment Clause theory, religious institu-
tions can be-and should be-protected under the Free Exercise
Clause. After all, the "theological" viewpoint's influence on the for-
mation of the Free Exercise Clause demonstrates that the Founders
viewed the church's right to select its own ministers as a fundamental
prerequisite for the corporate exercise of religion. 113 And, as Profes-
sor Laycock suggests, "regulation [that burdens religion] is properly
challenged under the free exercise clause." 1 14 Accordingly, in order
107 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (setting out a three-prong test requiring that the
statute have a "secular legislative purpose," that the statute have a "principal or pri-
mary effect" that "neither advances nor inhibits religion," and that the statute "not
foster excessive government entanglement with religion").
108 See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y ofJesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948-50 (9th Cir.
1999); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th
Cir. 1991); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164,
1169-71 (4th Cir. 1985).
109 Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948 n.2. The Lemon test has proven to be a malleable,
amorphous test that often yields results that cannot be justified under a proper histor-
ical reading of the Establishment Clause. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
110 See Laycock, supra note 10, at 1379-84.
111 Esbeck, supra note 10, at 351-52.
112 Id. at 397.
113 See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
114 Laycock, supra note 10, at 1384. Laycock argues that "[r]egulation that bur-
dens religion . . . is simply not establishment .... [C]ourts that have analyzed the
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to promote conceptual clarity in interpreting the Religion Clauses,
courts should protect the ecclesiastical sphere under an explicitly Free
Exercise Clause rationale rather than an Establishment Clause "entan-
glement" rationale. 115
III. MODERN APPLICATION OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
A. Church Autonomy Cases v. "Neutral Principles of Law" Cases
Despite the historical justification for the church autonomy doc-
trine and the ministerial exception to Title VII-as seen in the Foun-
ders' distinction between civil and ecclesiastical spheres of authority
and the early constitutional guarantees of church autonomy in minis-
terial employment decisions-critics of the ministerial exception have
contended that more recent developments at the Supreme Court have
undermined the church autonomy doctrine. These critics have
focused on the conflict between the Supreme Court's church auton-
omy cases and "neutral principles of law" cases. 116 In its church
autonomy cases-beginning with Watson v. Jones' 17-the Supreme
Court recognized the church autonomy doctrine, ultimately establish-
ing church autonomy as a constitutional principle in Kedroff."8 The
church autonomy cases, although susceptible to multiple interpreta-
tions,11 9 arguably included ministerial employment decisions as one
aspect of church autonomy.1 20 The Supreme Court, however, subse-
quently adopted a "neutral principles of law" analysis for church prop-
erty disputes in Wolf, 2' creating some doubt as to the scope of the
church autonomy cases. A comparison of Kedroff which comports
with the Founders' view of church autonomy, and Wolf suggests that
church labor relations cases in establishment clause terms have invoked the wrong
provision." Id.
115 In Petruska, the Third Circuit avoided the problem of conflating the Religion
Clauses by adopting a rationale grounded in the Free Exercise Clause. See supra text
accompanying notes 53-59. The Third Circuit only considered the Establishment
Clause if a particular claim survived the Free Exercise Clause's ministerial exception
inquiry. Petruska v. Gannon Univ. 462 F.3d 294, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2006), petition for
cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007) (No. 06-985). Petruska's approach
preserves the distinction between the Religion Clauses.
116 Ellenby, supra note 10, at 400-07; Lupu, supra note 10, at 405-08.
117 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
118 See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
119 Brady, supra note 10, at 1638-42.
120 Id. at 1638-39; Laycock, supra note 10, at 1394-98.
121 SeeJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (saying that courts may, at their
option, use "neutral principles of law" to resolve a church property dispute rather
than Watson's rule of deference to the church).
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the conflict between the competing lines of cases should be resolved
in favor of a broad ministerial exception to Tide VII.
1. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral and Jones v. Wolf
Kedroff involved a dispute between the American and Russian dio-
ceses of the Russian Orthodox Church regarding church govern-
ance. 122 The dispute focused on whether the American-elected
archbishop or the Russian-appointed archbishop had rightful author-
ity over the North American church. 123 The dispute prompted the
New York legislature to attempt to resolve the controversy by enacting
legislation transferring control of the New York churches from the
"mother" church in Russia to the American diocese. 124 The question
before the Court was whether the New York legislation violated the
First Amendment. 125
The Court concluded that "[1]egislation that regulates church
administration, the operation of the churches, [and] the appointment
of clergy ... prohibits the free exercise of religion"1 26 and violates the
"rule of separation between church and state."' 27 In support of its
conclusion, the Court cited Watson for the principle that "whenever
the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law, have been decided by the highest of these church judicato-
ries... the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final."' 28 The
Court went on to embrace Watson's protection of the church's
"unquestioned" right to organize "ecclesiastical government."' 29
According to the Court, Watson
radiates ... a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an inde-
pendence from secular control or manipulation-in short, power to
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom
to select the clergy ... must now be said to have federal constitu-
tional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against
state interference.] 30
122 Kedroff 344 U.S. at 103-04.
123 Id. at 96-97.
124 Id. at 107.
125 Id. at 100, 107.
126 Id. at 107-08.
127 Id. at 110.
128 Id. at 113 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871)).
129 Id. at 114 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727).
130 Id. at 116. The Court suggested that review might be possible if "improper
methods are proven," a reference to Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1
(1929). Gonzalez said that
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In the Court's opinion, the New York statute violated this constitu-
tional principle. Although the statute did not resolve a doctrinal ques-
tion-indeed, the case presented "no schism over faith or
doctrine" 1 3 1-it "directly prohibit[ed] the free exercise of an ecclesi-
astical right, the Church's choice of its hierarchy."1 3 2
Standing in apparent contradiction to the Court's decision in
Kedroff is Wolf Wolf involved a conflict over the ownership of church
property after a church schism divided a local congregation. 33 In
resolving the dispute, the lower courts applied a "neutral principles of
law analysis"-which consisted of examining deeds, state statutes, the
corporate charter, and the church's constitution in search of a "neu-
tral principle" that would resolve the dispute without addressing relig-
ious controversies-to determine whether the church property
belonged to the majority or minority faction of the congregation. 13 4
The Court concluded that the neutral principles of law approach
satisfied the First Amendment because it was "completely secular in
operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of relig-
ious organization and polity."'1 35 The Court acknowledged that the
First Amendment "prohibits civil courts from resolving church prop-
erty disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice" and
requires deference to church judicatories in "the resolution of issues
of religious doctrine or polity.' 36 However, the Court said that, sub-
ject to those constraints, courts are free to use "any one of various
approaches for settling church property disputes."1 37 Only if the
study of the relevant legal documents required the resolution of a
doctrinal question would a court have to defer to the ecclesiastical
organization. 138 The Court said that the neutral principles of law
it is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential
qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them.
In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the
proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting
civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive.
Id. at 16-17. However, in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976), the Court dismissed this exception as involving "exactly the inquiry that the
First Amendment prohibits." Id. at 713.
131 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120.
132 Id. at 119.
133 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 598 (1979).
134 Id. at 599-601.
135 Id. at 603.
136 Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
137 Id. (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
138 Id. at 604.
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approach would not violate the Free Exercise Clause because "relig-
ious societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the
event of a particular contingency," ensuring "that a dispute over the
ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the
desires of the members."139 Accordingly, the Court stated that the
First Amendment did not "require[ ] the States to adopt a rule of
compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving church prop-
erty disputes."1 40
2. Applying Kedroff and Wolf to Ministerial Exception Cases
Neither Kedroff nor Wolf directly addresses the ministerial excep-
tion. 41 Given their relevance to the broader church autonomy issue,
however, the principles espoused by these cases do have significant
implications for determining whether the Supreme Court's prece-
dents support a ministerial exception to Title VII. In cases involving
government regulation of church employment decisions under Title
VII, the Kedroff approach should govern for several reasons.
First, the factual situation in Kedroff provides a closer analog to
government regulation of church governance than Wo/f does. While
both cases involved a property dispute, Kedroff ultimately depended
on the resolution of an issue of church governance which the state
had attempted to regulate. 142 To resolve the question before it, the
Kedroff Court would have had to either independently resolve or
uphold legislation purporting to resolve which diocese had the
authority to select the church hierarchy. That determination was
clearly a function of church polity, much like the determination of
who is to serve as a minister in a local church. Indeed, the Court itself
recognized the factual similarity between the dispute at issue in Kedroff
and the typical ministerial exception case. 143 In contrast, Wolfdid not
ultimately require a decision regarding church governance; instead,
Wolf only required a determination regarding which faction of a once-
unified church had retained control over the church's property. 144
139 Id. at 603-04.
140 Id. at 605.
141 However, the Supreme Court did directly address judicial interference with
ministerial employment decisions in Milivojevich; in that case, the Supreme Court
found the judicial review of a church's removal of a bishop to be improper under the
First Amendment. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 698
(1976).
142 Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 96-98 (1952).
143 See id. at 107-08 (equating "church administration" and "appointment of
clergy").
144 Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602.
2028 [VOL. 82:5
WHEN BIG BROTHER PLAYS GOD
Even the Wolf Court acknowledged that, while the judiciary has the
authority to resolve church property disputes, the "resolution of issues
of religious doctrine or polity" must remain an ecclesiastical deci-
sion. 145 The analytical distinction between church property disputes
and church polity disputes 146 captures the key reason why Wofshould
not govern in ministerial exception cases: judicial resolution of a
property dispute does not create the same degree of coercion as legis-
lative regulation of church employment decisions and, therefore, does
not raise the same Free Exercise Clause concerns. 147
Second, the rationale that supported adopting the "neutral prin-
ciples of law" analysis in property dispute cases such as Wolf does not
undermine the Kedroff church autonomy doctrine as it relates to min-
isterial employment decisions. According to the Wolf Court, the "neu-
tral principles of law" analysis does not infringe on churches' free
exercise rights in cases involving property disputes because churches
could draft their documents so as to "ensure that a dispute . . .
[would] be resolved in accord with the desires of the members."' 48
However, while carefully drafting a church's charter and constitution
might guarantee that any eventual property dispute would be settled
145 Id. (emphasis added).
146 See Kauper, supra note 86, at 73.
147 The ministerial employment decision is so fundamental to religion that its reg-
ulation by the state creates a significant coercive effect. As Brady argued, "[i]f relig-
ious communities are not able to teach, develop, and live out their ideas free from
state interference, individual belief will . . . be suppressed." Brady, supra note 10, at
1677. In order to preserve religious communities' ability to maintain their beliefs,
churches must "retain the corollary right to select [their] voice [s]" free from govern-
ment interference. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007) (No. 06-985). These
fundamental concerns are not implicated in property disputes. Indeed, church prop-
erty disputes would be more likely to fit within Madison's exception to church auton-
omy for "preserving public order." Madison, supra note 103, at 487.
This line of demarcation between church polity decisions and church property
disputes-though a fine one-finds support by analogy from Petruska. In Petruska,
the Third Circuit distinguished adjudication of a Title VII claim from adjudication of
a contract claim. While "application of Title VII's discrimination and retaliation pro-
visions [to the ministerial employment decision] . . . would violate the Free Exercise
Clause," a similar application of "state contract law does not involve government-
imposed limits on [a religious institution's] right to select its ministers," and therefore
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Petruska, 462 F.3d at 308-10. After all, "[a]
church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through contract." Id. at 310.
148 Wolf 443 U.S. at 603-04. The Wolf Court did suggest in dicta that "neutral
provisions of state law governing the manner in which churches ... hire employees"
did not inhibit the free exercise of religion. Id. at 606. However, that assertion does
not comport with the Court's assurances that churches could ensure that litigation
would be resolved in accord with the members' desires.
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in a manner satisfactory to the church's interests, churches retain no
such protection in employment disputes involving a neutral, generally
applicable law like Tide VII. In employment disputes, the church has
no recourse to ensure that its interests would not be harmed. 149 The
absence of this measure of protection renders the Court's rationale
for dismissing the church's free exercise concerns moot-and makes
Wolfs applicability to ministerial employment decisions doubtful.
Third, unlike Wolf, the rationale of Kedroff does apply to situa-
tions involving neutral, generally applicable legislation such as Title
VII. In making the determination that questions of church govern-
ance are beyond civil authority, the Kedroff Court clearly held that
intentional government interference with church polity violated the
Constitution.1 50 However, the Kedroff Court did not indicate that it
had restricted-or intended to restrict-its holding to intentional gov-
ernment encroachment upon the ecclesiastical sphere. By recogniz-
ing "independence from secular control or manipulation" in
"select[ing] the clergy" as a part of "the free exercise of religion,"15 '
Kedroff also implicitly recognized church autonomy from facially neu-
tral legislation regulating ministerial employment decisions. If
churches have the power to make autonomous decisions regarding
"church government, " 152 then it does not matter whether the govern-
ment violates that autonomy intentionally or not. To hold otherwise
would reduce church autonomy to a matter of mere exemption from
otherwise valid laws.' 53 Church autonomy from government regula-
149 Indeed, facially neutral laws such as Tite VII can burden the free exercise of
religion. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1000 (1990).
150 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952). See Brady,
supra note 10, at 1641.
151 Kedroff 344 U.S. at 116.
152 Id.
153 The argument for church autonomy should be distinguished from the argu-
ment for individual religious exemptions at issue in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 878 (1990). The Founders' conception of a separate sphere of church
authority, outlined briefly in Part II, has no parallel in the debate over individual
exemptions. As the history of the Religion Clauses demonstrates, the argument for
church autonomy is not that an exception should be carved from a valid, enforceable
law within the state's authority; instead, the argument is that the state does not have
the authority to enforce the law against the church at all because church governance
is entirely outside its sphere of authority and is instead the responsibility of the
church. The D.C. Circuit used this logic when it distinguished Smith in EEOC v. Catho-
lic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996). According to the D.C. Circuit,
Smith does not stand "for the proposition that a church can never be relieved" from
complying with a neutral law for two reasons. Id. at 462. First, "the burden on free
exercise that is addressed by the ministerial exception is of a fundamentally different
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tion of ministerial employment decisions, if it is to be "autonomy" in
the true sense of the word, must include autonomy from facially neu-
tral laws.
Kedroff then, should govern in ministerial exception cases. While
church property decisions may be amenable to resolution through
"neutral principles of law" analysis, employment discrimination deci-
sions are not. Engaging in such an analysis would not promote neu-
trality at all; rather, it would subject a decision the Founders
recognized as within the church's exclusive sphere of autonomy to
regulation by the state. State regulation of church employment deci-
sions would bring the core functions of the church under civil cogni-
zancel 54 -a result expressly rejected by our Founders. In the words of
Madison, "The Rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment,
exceed the commission from which they derive their authority, and
are Tyrants. ' ' 55
B. Proper Scope of the Ministerial Exception
Even if scholars universally agreed that Kedroffs church auton-
omy doctrine governed ministerial exception cases, it would still be
necessary to determine the scope of the ministerial exception. The
issue is simply this-are employment decisions regarding both "relig-
ious function" and "secular function" employees exempt from govern-
ment regulation? Professor Bagni, in an early article on the
ministerial exception, suggested that the ministerial exception should
only protect employment decisions regarding "religious function"
employees.156 To Bagni, church relations with clergy must be "outside
the scope of civil regulation because otherwise there would be too
great an infringement on free exercise rights."' 57 In contrast, accord-
ing to Bagni, a church's relations with its "secular" employees could
be subject to government regulation because such regulation would
character from that at issue in Smith," and second, the ministerial exception can be
justified solely on the grounds that churches have a "fundamental right... to 'decide
for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government.'" Id.
(quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116).
154 See generally Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Relig-
ious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 99, 114 ("When the government coerces a group
to accept or to retain ... a person whom the group would otherwise reject or expel, it
blindly enters the religious domain.").
155 Madison, supra note 1, at 30-31. The possibility of inequity arising from auton-
omous church decisions "is far preferable to the conversion of secular courts into
ecclesiastical tribunals." PFEFFER, supra note 75, at 302.
156 Bagni, supra note 10, at 1539-40.
157 Id. at 1539.
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impose only a minimal burden on free exercise. 158 Most circuit courts
have accepted this general approach.15 9
This approach suffers from a significant flaw. As Bagni himself
noted, basing the level of protection on the function of the individual
employee makes the definition of "minister" critical. 160 One might
assume that it would be fairly simple to determine who does and who
does not have a significant spiritual role in a particular religious insti-
tution; if that were so, restricting the exemption to the church-minis-
ter relationship might not have much significance. However, an
employee's classification can form the central dispute in a Title VII
case 161 because the highly subjective "function" test employed by the
courts leaves this issue to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 162 Invit-
ing such fact-intensive judicial investigations into the inner workings
of churches has troubling implications; 163 granting the judiciary the
authority to define who performs "enough" spiritual functions to qual-
ify as a minister gives the government much the same power as it
would possess if the ministerial exemption did not exist. By narrowly
defining "minister," courts might-indeed, will inevitably-refuse to
protect positions that a church may deem vital to its spiritual integ-
rity. 164 The current approach permits the judiciary to control a
church by imposing liability for refusing to hire individuals who may
not comport with the church's religious mores even if the church
attaches great spiritual significance to the position that the court
deems "secular."165 The power to define what is and what is not a
ministerial position within a church-and, hence, what is central to
the church-is the power to define the church itself.166
158 Id. at 1539-44.
159 See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 304 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006), petition for
cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007) (No. 06-985).
160 Bagni, supra note 10, at 1545.
161 See, e.g., EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283-85
(1981) (concluding that four ordained Baptist ministers did not qualify for the minis-
terial exception because they did not perform "ecclesiastical or religious" tasks).
162 See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
163 See Brady, supra note 10, at 1694-95.
164 Id. (explaining how the Fifth Circuit defined "minister" in a manner "incom-
patible with . . .Catholic polity").
165 See Gedicks, supra note 154, at 138-69; Treaver Hodson, Comment, The Relig-
ious Employer Exemption Under Title WI: Should a Church Define Its Own Activities?, 1994
BYU L. REv. 571, 586.
166 See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding
Part P Establishment ofReligion, 44 WM, & MARY L. REv. 2105, 2138 (2003) ("The power
to appoint and remove ministers is the power to control the church.").
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This issue arose in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos.167 In Amos, which upheld the
constitutionality of the statutory exemption from Title VII,168 the
Court concluded that the judiciary must leave the definition of "relig-
ious function" to the church. 169 As Justice Brennan acknowledged in
his concurring opinion, "[d]etermining that certain activities are in
furtherance of an organization's religious mission, and that only those
committed to that mission should conduct them, is . . . a means by
which a religious community defines itself. '170 If the courts arrogated
the responsibility to determine whether an activity is religious or secu-
lar, they would assume a distinctly religious function-that of defining
the nature of the religious institution. "While a church may regard
the conduct of certain functions as integral to its mission, a court may
disagree .... As a result, the community's process of self-definition
would be shaped in part by the prospects of litigation." 171 Such uncer-
tainty might unduly burden the religious practices of a church:
[I] t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it,
on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a sec-
ular court will consider religious .... Fear of potential liability might
affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be
its religious mission. 172
In turn, this burden contravenes the Free Exercise Clause.
In light of these constitutional concerns, the ministerial excep-
tion must encompass all employment decisions made by churches. As
Professor Brady argued, "the only effective and workable protection
for the ability of religious groups to preserve, transmit, and develop
their beliefs . . . is a broad right of church autonomy that extends to
all aspects of church affairs." 173 In contrast, Bagni's definition
requires an extensive inquiry into church affairs in order to determine
whether an employee engages in "religious" or "secular" functions;
that inquiry runs counter to the Supreme Court's conclusion in
Amos.174 For churches to maintain their autonomy, their core func-
tions must not be subject to government definition. Indeed, permit-
167 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987).
168 Id. at 335-40.
169 Id. at 327-28; see also EvANs, supra note 81, at 129 ("The Court held that the
threshold question-whether an activity of a church is a religious activity-was itself a
distinction reserved for the institution alone.").
170 Amos, 483 U.S. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring).
171 Id. at 343-44.
172 Id. at 336 (majority opinion).
173 Brady, supra note 10, at 1698.
174 See Gedicks, supra note 154, at 148.
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ting the judiciary to define what is "truly" religious would subject the
scope of church autonomy to the limits tolerated by the state. That, to
be certain, was precisely what Madison rejected; religious liberty is not
a matter of toleration, but rather of unalienable right.175
CONCLUSION
This Note has suggested that the Free Exercise Clause demands a
broad ministerial exception to Title VII. The Founders protected
church autonomy under the Free Exercise Clause and recognized that
civil government does not have the authority to regulate church gov-
ernance; indeed, early state constitutions identified ministerial deci-
sions as an integral part of churches' exclusive sphere of authority.
The Supreme Court faithfully reflected the Founders' conception of
church autonomy in Kedroff where it acknowledged that matters of
church polity and governance are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the church. The Supreme Court extended that conception of church
autonomy in Amos, recognizing that the judiciary must not usurp the
church's role in defining what is or is not a spiritual function. Accord-
ingly, courts should enforce a ministerial exception encompassing
both "secular" and ministerial employees in order to prevent the gov-
ernment from interfering with church governance.
There remains an even more fundamental question-one that
can only be raised here. Entirely apart from the question of whether
churches do have autonomy is the question of whether churches
should have that autonomy. There are-as might be expected-two
competing views. One supports vibrant religious freedom and posits
that religious institutions act as an important restraint on civil govern-
ment. "[D]emocratic government flourishes best," according to
Brady, "when religious communities are free to develop, teach, and
practice their religious beliefs and doctrines without government
interference."'1 76 Gedicks framed this idea in negative terms: "IO]ne
has more to fear from unlimited governmental power than from a
strong right of religious group autonomy; it is the latter that will serve
as a check on the former."'177 The opposing view, in contrast, seeks to
restrain religious freedom and suggests that religious institutions con-
stitute a threat that the state can choose to tolerate or regulate. Lupu
argued that "[1]arge and powerful religious institutions . . .may be a
threat to .. .the operation of the machinery of the state,"1 78 while
175 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
176 Brady, supra note 10, at 1705.
177 Gedicks, supra note 154, at 99.
178 Lupu, supra note 10, at 442.
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Ellenby asserted that churches form "a powerful obstacle to the
administration of justice."'' 79 According to this viewpoint, the state
restrains religious institutions, not vice versa. Those who adopt this
view and advocate government regulation of core religious decisions,
however, must answer one question-is it wise to ask "Big Brother" to
play God?
179 Ellenby, supra note 10, at 411.
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